In the photo below, the Director of Immigration Services, Vien Siu, assists a Karen client, Ms. Sa Tin, with her paperwork. The other images are of happy family reunifications thanks to the dedicated efforts of MHRO staff. In some cases, family reunification requires years of advocacy and follow-up with the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Dept. of State, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Office (USCIS)/ Dept. of Homeland Security,  U.S. Embassies such as the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and the U.S. Consulate in Saigon ( Ho Chi Minh City) Vietnam.

MHRO also advocates with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in refugee sites throughout S.E. Asia and Africa in efforts to protect refugees and to insure successful family reunification and refugee empowerment.

“THE EXPERT ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’

12-16 July 2010

VIETNAM GOVERNMENT TRIES TO BLOCK MONTAGNARD SPEECH

Rong Nay

Executive Director, Rong Nay and Director of Immigration Services, Vien Siu, participated in a United Nations Conference on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Geneva, Switzerland on July 12-16, 2010.

The Expert Representatives at the conference were: Mr. John Henriksen (Norway) Ms. Jannie Lasimbang (Malaysia) Mr. Jose Molintas (Philippines) Mr. Jose Carlos Morales (Costa Rica) and Ms. Catherine Odimba Kombe ( Democratic Republic of Congo).

Many States Members of the United Nations had Observer Representatives including, but not limited to:  Armenia, Belgium, Australia, Iran, India,  Peru, Mexico, Paraguay, Japan, New Zealand, Finland, Togo and Thailand.

United Nations Bodies included: UNESCO, UNITAR, European Union and the World Bank. Non-governmental organizations and indigenous peoples organizations included the Montagnard Human Rights Organization (MHRO),  Incomindios, Indian Council of South America, International Indian Treaty Council, Association of Indigenous Women, Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia, Khmer-Kampuchea-Krom Federation,  National Union of the Kanak People, New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, Native Women’s Association of Canada, Legal Commission for the Self-development of the Original Andean Peoples, Syriac Universal Alliance, Te Runanga o Te Rarawa, Return to the Land, Ochapowace First Nation, Rehoboth Community of Namibia, Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples of America, Supreme National Council of Kampuchea-Krom, the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Culture of Afro-indigenous Solidarity, Hawai’i   Institute for Human Rights, The Delegation for the Cham Nation’s Issues and many other indigenous peoples’ representatives.

Sessions included discussions concerning human rights, economic development, cultural rights and land rights. The conference was an excellent opportunity for MHRO to network with other international indigenous peoples’ representatives, and to advocate on behalf of the Montagnard “Anak Cu Chiang”  peoples to human rights representatives from the United Nations

A disturbing incident took place when a representative from the Vietnam Mission to the United Nations complained about the Montagnard Human Rights Organization representatives and attempted to block MHRO’s speech at one of the sessions, citing that “Vietnam had no indigenous peoples” and therefore, MHRO had no right to participate in the forum. The Vietnamese representative removed the name of the MHRO speakers from the list. MHRO representatives complained about this to the UN conference organizers. (SEE MHRO STATEMENT BELOW)

.

PRESS RELEASE

The Indigenous Peoples of Vietnam are denied by the government of Vietnam at the United Nations Conference on “Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” on July 12-16, 2010

The indigenous peoples of Vietnam: The Montagnards, called Anak Cu Chiang, Khmer Krom and Cham represented the indigenous tribes at the “Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” conference at Geneva on July 12-16, 2010. This was an opportunity to express their opinions concerning the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Vietnam.  Unfortunately since the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was announced on September 13, 2007, the government of Vietnam has ignored and not recognized the Montagnard people as Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration still has no affect on our people’s lives, and Vietnam seems to have nothing to do with the Declaration, despite the fact that Vietnam endorsed  the UN Declaration September 13, 2007.

For these reasons, since 1975 to the present, living conditions, especially for Montagnards in the Central Highlands have become worse than ever in our history.  We are now in danger of losing our entire culture.  We have lived through terrible times; living a life of deprivation from hand to mouth.  Since the onset of colonialism, the Montagnards have never had the chance to know the happiness of peace and self determination.  Thirteen thousand Vietnamese students came to US for education, but no single Montagnard is allowed. The Montagnard people have few if any opportunities to develop and this has become worse under the Hanoi government.

The government of Vietnam declares it has changed, but conditions of persecution and racism continue. Change and economic improvement happens for the Vietnamese in the city in order to gain more trust and credibility from the U.S. and international donors, but little development assistance reaches the Montagnard villages. The Montagnards are the poorest of the poor in Vietnam. This is documented year after year by UNICEF and the UN Development Programme.  Vietnam’s policies are intentional towards the tribal peoples. The policies promote ethnic cleansing and assimilation. The government proclaims freedom of religion, but in reality the churches are not free and Christians are forced to register with government churches controlled by pastors who work for the government.

Today our Montagnard people have lost more than any other group in Vietnam.  The right to live, personal freedom, the right to own our ancestral lands, the right to have churches, the right to teach our own language and our traditional way of life have all systematically been abolished. Throughout history, we have been living and raising our families in our own ancestral homelands for thousands of years. By that fact, and by common law, we are the rightful owners of our own lands. But now, the Vietnamese colonizers deny us that right and even classify us as “minorities” with a reverse history that we migrated to live in their land.  It is the intentional deception of the Vietnamese government to claim that there are no indigenous peoples in Vietnam because such strategy furthers their policies of land seizure and ethnic cleansing.

This  fact was confirmed by Vietnam’s Permanent Mission’s speech addressed at Geneva on July 14, 2010.  The representative stated that there are no Indigenous Peoples in Vietnam’s country but only minority groups living in Vietnam territories without their original history. They also removed our name from the list of speakers at the conference. This disturbing and insulting action reflects that the government of Vietnam still looks down on the indigenous peoples and refers to us as “MOI” meaning “Savages.” The Anak Cu Chiang Montagnard peoples are a proud people with a beautiful culture, languages, and ancient heritage. It is distinctive and original, and it is not connected to the culture or the origins of the Vietnamese (Kinh) people.

The government of Vietnam  endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on September 13, 2007 along with other 144 countries and is supposed to honor the endorsement. This contradictory action of Vietnam leaves us no choice but to believe that Vietnam tries to evade its responsibilities as specified by the Declaration. This action has been confirmed since the government of Vietnam does not discuss the Declaration, nor have there been translations of the Declaration into Vietnamese or major Indigenous peoples languages  in Vietnam. The indigenous populations still know nothing about the Declaration due to this governmental manipulation.

Historically, during the French-Indochina war between French and Ho Chi Minh, the Montagnard Indigenous Peoples in the Central Highlands were under French rule 106 years and were granted autonomy on May 27, 1946. After the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, the French withdrew its power from Indochina. Bao Dai  was the last King of South Vietnam and he linvaded and completely occupied Central Highlands in 1955. After the election, Ngo Dinh Diem, the first President of South Vietnam illegally abolished the autonomy of the Montagnard people that had been granted by the French on May 27, 1946. Diem also set up programs that caused the illegal settlement a half million Vietnamese from the North to the Central Highlands and occupied almost all the fertile land of the Montagnard.

In 1956, the war between North and South Vietnam began and both governments used the Montagnard Indigenous Peoples as tools of the war; especially, the North Vietnam government. Ho Chi Minh  promised that the Montagnard autonomy would be restored after victory of South Vietnam. In this war more than a million of the Montagnards were killed and 85% Montagnard villages were destroyed. The Vietnam War was exploited by Ho Chi Minh in an effort to justify the occupation of our lands.

After the Communists won the war in 1975, peace never came to the Montagnard people, only despair. The  Montagnard sacrifice was ignored and all Montagnard leaders were killed. Ho Chi Minh’s promise of autonomy and self-government for the Montagnards was broken. The future held only betrayal, death and decades of suffering for the Montagnards.  We are now faced with our ongoing peaceful stand until Vietnam recognizes us as Indigenous Peoples in order for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples can take effect and bring benefit to our unfortunate people as intended. We call on the United Nations and the international community for intervention and guidance as we seek solutions for millions of indigenous individuals who are in peril of being silenced forever by the dictatorial and manipulative regime of Vietnam.

Rong Nay

July 2010

On July 4th, 2004, MHRO organized 58 Montagnards from North Carolina to participate in the National Independence Day Parade in Washington DC. All of the Montagnard participants proudly displayed their traditional dress. This is the first time after 17 years for the Montagnard Community in the US to share the great joy and privilege of celebrating freedom on America’s Independence Day in Washington, DC.

In the past, the distinct and beautiful culture of the Montagnard people was not known by the world. We felt enveloped by the Vietnamese and there was darkness of ignorance in the minds of foreign people for a very long time. From the bottom of our hearts, we would like to thank the government of the United States and the American people for their special kindness, love, and care on providing sanctuary and shelter for the Montagnards in North Carolina. We have enjoyed the real freedom of the American people for ourselves, especially the freedom of religion. The Montagnard American July 4th celebration was a time we celebrated America and our unique culture. Wherever we live and travel, our culture is important.

ORDER A TRADITIONAL MUSIC CD

“Anak Cu Chiang” The Traditional Music of the “MontagnardPeople” is the first CD of its kind which features traditional Montagnard musicwith a booklet of songs, rare photographs, historical commentary, and translations of the compositions.

A grant from the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation to the Vietnam Highlands Assistance Project (VHAP) helped finance the production costs for the recording. Themusic includes lyrics and instrumentals from the five major tribal groups: Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, Koho, and Mnong.

This CD marks a victory in the cultural preservation of our people whoare in peril of losing our distinctive culture and ethnic identity both in Vietnam and the West. Many of the songs have been composed and performed by talented elders who would have never been able to record such songs in Vietnam at the present time.

Music which is included highlights instrumentals with the “cing“,”dingbuot” “ding nam,” ” trung” and “ding tak ta“, and also includes the very intricate and poetic “Klei Kut, Klei Due” narrative chant among other selections.

We hope this CD will deepen your understanding and appreciation ofMontagnard culture and history. By making a purchase, you are takinga stand in supporting the efforts to preserve our Montagnard Heritage. Thank you.

To Order:
Send a check for $ 20.00 to:

The Montagnard Culture Group
1018 Castalia Drive
Cary, NC USA 27513

by JAMIE DEAN in Raleigh, N.C.

Montagnard World Article (pdf file)

The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter,

Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such,

Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind,

Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,

Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind,

Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests,

Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources,

Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with States,

Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,

Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,

Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment,

Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the world,

Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their children, consistent with the rights of the child,

Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of international concern, interest, responsibility and character,

Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between indigenous peoples and States,

Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,(3) affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,

Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law,

Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith,

Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned,

Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples,

Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field,

Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples,

Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration,

Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect:

Article 1
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(4) and international human rights law.

Article 2
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.

Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

Article 6
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.

Article 7
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.

Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.

Article 9
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.

Article 10
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.

Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.

Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains.
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 13
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.

Article 14
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.

Article 15
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information.
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society.

Article 16
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.

Article 17
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights established under applicable international and domestic labour law.
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their special vulnerability and the importance of education for their empowerment.
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, employment or salary.

Article 18
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 19
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.

Article 20
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.

Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Article 22
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the implementation of this Declaration.
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination.

Article 23
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.

Article 24
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without any discrimination, to all social and health services.
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this right.

Article 25
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard.

Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 27
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.

Article 28
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.

Article 29
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented.

Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.

Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.

Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 33
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.

Article 34
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.

Article 35
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their communities.

Article 36
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right.

Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.

Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Article 39
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this Declaration.

Article 40
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.

Article 41
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established.

Article 42
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.

Article 43
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.

Article 44
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.

Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.

Article 46
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.

(2) See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

(3) A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.

(4) Resolution 217 A (III).

The DHRC brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to promote new understandings of pressing questions about human rights, terror, political violence and the politics of forgiveness, accountability and reconciliation.

Read more about the Duke Human Rights Center. www.duke.edu/web/rightsatduke

The Montagnard Human Rights Organization has formed a partnership with Duke University’s Center for Human Rights in early 2009. There have been several meetings with Ms. Robin Kirk, the Director of the Center and several faculty members who are associated with the Human Rights Center.

MHRO staff and representatives have given presentations to faculty and students at Duke. MHRO is also conducting research on the Montagnard “Framework for Freedom” through the cooperation of key faculty who have teaching and research interests in the area of human rights, indigenous rights, ethnic identity, self-determination and sovereignty.

The collaboration with Duke is moving forward with research and the gathering of documents for a special Montagnard community archives and collection. Plans are underway for a historic international conference that will focus on the history and the future of the Montagnard people in Vietnam, including discussions about models of self-governance. International scholars will be invited, along with policy makers and government officials.

About the Duke Human Rights Center

The Duke Human Rights Center brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars and students to promote new understandings about human rights, terror, political violence and the politics of forgiveness, accountability and reconciliation. Our objective is to create a synergy that will position Duke as a leader in cutting-edge, creative scholarship and teaching on these themes.

The Initiative seeks to promote collaborative, cross-disciplinary and critical thinking, education and research at Duke about human rights issues. As a group and as individuals, we meet regularly to discuss and plan events and develop new courses and areas of research, making connections between faculty, students and practitioners. Over the past two years, the Initiative has sponsored over a dozen rights-related events, many of them generating media coverage and attention outside Duke. We have also helped develop six new human rights-related courses for undergraduates, all with service-learning components. Eventually, we hope to offer a certificate in human rights and provide undergraduates with increased opportunities for mentored research, internships and course-related practice in the human rights field.

ICTY prosecutor Dan Saxon speaks
with Duke Faculty and graduate students
[see more]

In a related endeavor, we are working with the Library to develop new human rights-related archives. In 2005-2006, we assisted the Special Collections Department in the acquisition of the archives of the Center for International Policy, an important US-based human rights group located in Washington, DC. We continue to look for appropriate human rights-related institutions that could benefit from depositing their materials at Duke.

One of our key aims is to bridge the existing gap between civil rights and human rights communities, emphasizing a global view that connects advances in human rights abroad with emerging challenges to human rights at home. Duke is favorably positioned in this regard, able to contribute original research and thinking on the civil rights movement to human rights debate and vice versa. As one example of how this can work, in the Fall of 2005 Duke undergraduates sponsored by the Initiative interned for the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the first US-based effort to apply the lessons of South Africa to the American experience. Also that fall, we sponsored a conference on labor rights, drawing the experiences of the past into new perspectives for unions, immigrants and the unfulfilled promises for economic justice of the civil rights era.

A more ambitious goal is to lay the intellectual and institutional groundwork for the establishment of a Duke University Center for Human Rights. We envision the center as dynamic, multivocal crossroads where scholars, writers, artists, officials, literary critics, filmmakers, journalists and human rights activists will present, exchange and sharpen ideas about human rights issues including women’s and children’s rights; rights with respect to poverty and racism, religious freedom and fundamentalism; artistic and journalistic freedoms; refugees and exile; the place of human rights in the war on terror; and the politics of justice, forgetting, and accountability in the shadow of mass violence. Eventually, we hope to establish a semester-long residency at Duke for a human rights activist, inviting a domestic activist and an international activist in alternate years. This program will be linked to the on-going development of the Scholars at Risk program.
View the catalog of Duke Human Rights and Rights-Related courses for Spring 2008.

Duke Human Rights Center – rights@duke.edu

Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2009

To promote freedom and democracy in Vietnam.

current 111st session of congress

Back to Bill Details

Version History

Loading Bill Text

HR 1969 IH

111th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 1969

To promote freedom and democracy in Vietnam.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 2, 2009

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. WOLF, Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California, Mr. CAO, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. ROHRABACHER, and Mr. PENCE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote freedom and democracy in Vietnam.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the ‘Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2009’.

(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Purpose.

TITLE I–PROHIBITION ON INCREASED NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Sec. 101. Bilateral nonhumanitarian assistance.

TITLE II–PROHIBITION ON GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES AUTHORITY FOR VIETNAM

Sec. 201. Prohibition on Generalized System of Preferences.

TITLE III–ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM

Sec. 301. Assistance.

TITLE IV–UNITED STATES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Sec. 401. Radio Free Asia transmissions to Vietnam.

Sec. 402. United States educational and cultural exchange programs with Vietnam.

TITLE V–UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY

Sec. 501. Refugee resettlement for nationals of Vietnam.

TITLE VI–ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM

Sec. 601. Annual report.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The relationship between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has grown substantially since the end of the trade embargo in 1994, with annual trade between the 2 countries reaching over $15,200,000,000 in 2008.

(2) The Government of Vietnam’s transition toward greater economic freedom and trade has not been matched by greater political freedom and substantial improvements in basic human rights for Vietnamese citizens, including freedom of religion, expression, association, and assembly.

(3) The United States Congress agreed to Vietnam becoming an official member of the World Trade Organization in 2006, amidst assurances that the Government of Vietnam was steadily improving its human rights record and would continue to do so.

(4) Vietnam remains a one-party state, ruled and controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which continues to deny the right of citizens to change their government.

(5) Although in recent years the National Assembly of Vietnam has played an increasingly active role as a forum for highlighting local concerns, corruption, and inefficiency, the National Assembly remains subject to the direction of the CPV and the CPV maintains control over the selection of candidates in national and local elections.

(6) The Government of Vietnam forbids public challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party state, restricts freedoms of opinion, the press, and association and tightly limits access to the Internet and telecommunication.

(7) Since Vietnam’s accession to the WTO on January 11, 2007, the Government of Vietnam arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned several individuals for their peaceful advocacy of democracy, including Father Nguyen Van Ly and human rights lawyers Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan.

(8) The Government of Vietnam continues to detain, imprison, place under house arrest, convict, or otherwise restrict persons for the peaceful expression of dissenting political or religious views.

(9) The Government of Vietnam has also failed to improve labor rights, continues to arrest and harass labor leaders, and restricts the right to organize independently.

(10) The Government of Vietnam continues to limit freedom of religion and restrict the operation of religious organizations.

(11) Despite reported progress in church openings and legal registrations of religious venues, the Government of Vietnam has halted most positive actions since the Department of State lifted the ‘country of particular concern’ (CPC) designation for Vietnam in November 2006.

(12) Unregistered ethnic minority Protestant congregations suffer severe abuses because of actions by the Government of Vietnam, which have included forced renunciations of faith, arrest and harassment, the withholding of social programs provided for the general population, confiscation and destruction of property, and subjection to severe beatings.

(13) During a peaceful Catholic prayer vigil for the return of government confiscated church properties, protestors were dispersed after being harassed, some were detained, and some of the property was destroyed. Catholics continue to face some restrictions on selection of clergy, the establishment of seminaries and seminary candidates, and restrictions on individual cases of travel and church registration.

(14) The Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) suffers persecutions as the Government of Vietnam continues to restrict contacts and movement of senior UBCV clergy for refusing to join the state sponsored Buddhist organizations, the Government restricts expression and assembly, and the Government continues to harass and threaten UBCV monks, nuns, and youth leaders.

(15) The Government of Vietnam continues to suppress the activities of other religious adherents, including Cao Dai and Hoa Hao who lack official recognition or have chosen not to affiliate with the state-sanctioned groups, including through the use of detention and imprisonment.

(16) During Easter weekend in April 2004, thousands of Montagnards gathered to protest their treatment by the Government of Vietnam, including the confiscation of tribal lands and ongoing restrictions on religious activities. Credible reports indicate that the protests were met with violent response as many demonstrators were arrested, injured, went into hiding, and that others were killed. Many of these Montagnards are still serving long sentences for their involvement in peaceful demonstrations in 2001 and 2004. Government officials continue to severely restrict Montagnard movement and prohibit them from seeking asylum in Cambodia.

(17) Ethnic minority Hmong in the Northwest Highlands of Vietnam also suffer restrictions, abuses, and persecution by the Government of Vietnam, and although the Government is now allowing some Hmong Protestants to organize and conduct religious activity, some government officials continue to deny or ignore additional applications for registration.

(18) On February 8, 2007, the Government of Vietnam arrested and defrocked several ethnic Khmer Buddhists in response to a peaceful religious protest. The Government continues to restrict Khmer Krom expression, assembly, association, and controls all religious organizations and prohibits most peaceful protests.

(19) The Government of Vietnam controls all print and electronic media, including access to the Internet, jams the signals of some foreign radio stations, including Radio Free Asia, and has detained and imprisoned individuals who have posted, published, sent, or otherwise distributed democracy-related materials.

(20) People arrested in Vietnam because of their political or religious affiliations and activities often are not accorded due legal process as they lack full access to lawyers of their choice, may experience closed trials, have often been detained for years without trial, and have been subjected to the use of torture to admit crimes they did not commit or to falsely denounce their own leaders.

(21) Vietnam continues to be a source country for the commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor of women and girls, for men and women legally entering into international labor contracts who subsequently face conditions of debt bondage or forced labor, and is a destination country for child trafficking and continues to have internal human trafficking.

(22) Although the Government of Vietnam is making progress in combating human trafficking, it does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.

(23) United States refugee resettlement programs, including the Humanitarian Resettlement (HR) Program, the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) Program, general resettlement of boat people from refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia, the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1988, and the Priority One Refugee resettlement category have helped rescue Vietnamese nationals who have suffered persecution on account of their associations with the United States as well as Vietnamese nationals who have been persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

(24) While previous programs have served their purposes well, a significant number of eligible refugees from Vietnam were unfairly denied or excluded, including Amerasians, in some cases by vindictive or corrupt Vietnamese officials who controlled access to the programs, and in others by United States personnel who imposed unduly restrictive interpretations of program criteria. In addition, the Government of Vietnam has denied passports to persons who the United States has found eligible for refugee admission.

(25) Congress has passed numerous resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Vietnam, indicating that although there has been an expansion of relations with the Government of Vietnam, it should not be construed as approval of the ongoing and serious violations of fundamental human rights in Vietnam.

(26) Enhancement of relations between the United States and Vietnam has proved an opportunity for a human rights dialogue and could lead to future progress on human rights issues in Vietnam.

SEC. 3. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this Act is to promote the development of freedom and democracy in Vietnam.

TITLE I–PROHIBITION ON INCREASED NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

SEC. 101. BILATERAL NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Assistance-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsection (b), the Federal Government may not provide nonhumanitarian assistance to the Government of Vietnam during any fiscal year in an amount that exceeds the amount of such assistance provided during fiscal year 2009 unless–

(A) the Federal Government provides assistance, in addition to the assistance authorized under section 301(b), supporting the creation and facilitation of human rights training, civil society capacity building, noncommercial rule of law programming, and exchange programs between the Vietnamese National Assembly and the United States Congress at levels commensurate with, or exceeding, any increases in nonhumanitarian assistance to Vietnam;

(B) with respect to the limitation for fiscal year 2010, the President determines and certifies to Congress, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, that the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (2) have been met during the 12-month period ending on the date of the certification; and

(C) with respect to the limitation for subsequent fiscal years, the President determines and certifies to Congress, in the most recent annual report submitted pursuant to section 601, that the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (2) have been met during the 12-month period covered by the report.

(2) REQUIREMENTS- The requirements of this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward releasing all political and religious prisoners from imprisonment, house arrest, and other forms of detention.

(B) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward–

(i) respecting the right to freedom of religion, including the right to participate in religious activities and institutions without interference, harassment, or involvement of the Government, for all of Vietnam’s diverse religious communities; and

(ii) returning estates and properties confiscated from the churches and religious communities.

(C) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward respecting the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, including the release of independent journalists, bloggers, and democracy and labor activists.

(D) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward repealing or revising laws that criminalize peaceful dissent, independent media, unsanctioned religious activity, and nonviolent demonstrations and rallies, in accordance with international standards and treaties to which Vietnam is a party.

(E) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward allowing Vietnamese nationals free and open access to United States refugee programs.

(F) The Government of Vietnam has made substantial progress toward respecting the human rights of members of all ethnic and minority groups.

(G) Neither any official of the Government of Vietnam nor any agency or entity wholly or partly owned by the Government of Vietnam was complicit in a severe form of trafficking in persons, or the Government of Vietnam took all appropriate steps to end any such complicity and hold such official, agency, or entity fully accountable for its conduct.

(b) Exception-

(1) CONTINUATION OF ASSISTANCE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST- Notwithstanding the failure of the Government of Vietnam to meet the requirements of subsection (a)(2), the President may waive the application of subsection (a) for any fiscal year if the President determines that the provision to the Government of Vietnam of increased nonhumanitarian assistance would promote the purpose of this Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.

(2) EXERCISE OF WAIVER AUTHORITY- The President may exercise the authority under paragraph (1) with respect to–

(A) all United States nonhumanitarian assistance to Vietnam; or

(B) one or more programs, projects, or activities of such assistance.

(c) Definitions- In this section:

(1) NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- The term ‘nonhumanitarian assistance’ means–

(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of that Act, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation), other than–

(i) disaster relief assistance, including any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of that Act;

(ii) assistance which involves the provision of food (including monetization of food) or medicine;

(iii) assistance for refugees; and

(iv) assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, including any assistance under section 104A of that Act; and

(B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the Arms Export Control Act.

(2) SEVERE FORMS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS- The term ‘severe form of trafficking in persons’ means any activity described in section 103(8) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-386 (114 Stat. 1470); 22 U.S.C. 7102(8)).

TITLE II–PROHIBITION ON GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES AUTHORITY FOR VIETNAM

SEC. 201. PROHIBITION ON GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES.

(a) Prohibition- The President may not provide duty-free treatment for eligible articles from Vietnam under title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.) until the President determines and certifies to Congress that the Government of Vietnam meets the requirements described in subsection (b).

(b) Requirements- The requirements described in this subsection are the following:

(1) The Government of Vietnam fully protects the freedom of association, in law and practice.

(2) The Government of Vietnam does not engage in or condone serious violations of the rights of workers, including the detention, harassment, or arrest of labor activists or individuals who write, speak, or otherwise disseminate information relating to labor rights.

TITLE III–ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM

SEC. 301. ASSISTANCE.

(a) In General- The President is authorized to provide assistance, through appropriate nongovernmental organizations and the Human Rights Defenders Fund, for the support of individuals and organizations to promote internationally recognized human rights in Vietnam.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out subsection (a) $2,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 and 2011.

TITLE IV–UNITED STATES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SEC. 401. RADIO FREE ASIA TRANSMISSIONS TO VIETNAM.

(a) Policy of the United States- It is the policy of the United States to take such measures as are necessary to overcome the jamming of Radio Free Asia by the Government of Vietnam.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations- In addition to such amounts as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the policy under subsection (a) $12,5000,000 for the fiscal year 2010 and $2,500,000 for fiscal year 2011.

SEC. 402. UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH VIETNAM.

It is the policy of the United States that programs of educational and cultural exchange with Vietnam should actively promote progress toward freedom and democracy in Vietnam by providing opportunities to Vietnamese nationals from a wide range of occupations and perspectives to see freedom and democracy in action and, also, by ensuring that Vietnamese nationals who have already demonstrated a commitment to these values are included in such programs.

TITLE V–UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY

SEC. 501. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT FOR NATIONALS OF VIETNAM.

(a) Policy of the United States- It is the policy of the United States to offer refugee resettlement to nationals of Vietnam (including members of the Montagnard ethnic minority groups) who were eligible for the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), the Humanitarian Resettlement (HR) Program, the Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) Program, the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1988, or any other United States refugee program and who were deemed ineligible due to administrative error or who for reasons beyond the control of such individuals (including insufficient or contradictory information or the inability to pay bribes demanded by officials of the Government of Vietnam) were unable or failed to apply for such programs in compliance with deadlines imposed by the Department of State.

(b) Authorized Activity- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Migration and Refugee Assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be made available for the protection (including resettlement in appropriate cases) of Vietnamese refugees and asylum seekers, including Montagnards and ethnic Khmer in Cambodia and Thailand.

TITLE VI–ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM

SEC. 601. ANNUAL REPORT.

(a) In General- Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Congress a report on the following:

(1) The determination and certification of the President that the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (G) of section 101(a)(2) have been met, if applicable.

(2) Steps taken to carry out section 101(a)(1)(A), if applicable.

(3) Efforts by the United States Government to secure transmission sites for Radio Free Asia in countries in close geographical proximity to Vietnam in accordance with section 401(a).

(4) Efforts to ensure that programs with Vietnam promote the policy set forth in section 402 and with section 105 of the Human Rights, Refugee, and Other Foreign Policy Provisions Act of 1996 regarding participation in programs of educational and cultural exchange.

(5) Steps taken to carry out the policy under section 501(a).

(6) Lists of persons believed to be imprisoned, detained, or placed under house arrest, tortured, or otherwise persecuted by the Government of Vietnam due to their pursuit of internationally recognized human rights. In compiling such lists, the Secretary shall exercise appropriate discretion, including concerns regarding the safety and security of, and benefit to, the persons who may be included on the lists and their families. In addition, the Secretary shall include a list of such persons and their families who may qualify for protections under United States refugee programs.

(7) A description of the development of the rule of law in Vietnam, including–

(A) progress toward the development of institutions of democratic governance;

(B) processes by which statutes, regulations, rules, and other legal acts of the Government of Vietnam are developed and become binding within Vietnam;

(C) the extent to which statutes, regulations, rules, administrative and judicial decisions, and other legal acts of the Government of Vietnam are published and are made accessible to the public;

(D) the extent to which administrative and judicial decisions are supported by statements of reasons that are based upon written statutes, regulations, rules, and other legal acts of the Government of Vietnam;

(E) the extent to which individuals are treated equally under the laws of Vietnam without regard to citizenship, race, religion, political opinion, or current or former associations;

(F) the extent to which administrative and judicial decisions are independent of political pressure or governmental interference and are reviewed by entities of appellate jurisdiction; and

(G) the extent to which laws in Vietnam are written and administered in ways that are consistent with international human rights standards, including the requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(b) Contacts With Other Organizations- In preparing the report under subsection (a), the Secretary shall, as appropriate, seek out and maintain contacts with nongovernmental organizations and human rights advocates (including Vietnamese-Americans and human rights advocates in Vietnam), including receiving reports and updates from such organizations and evaluating such reports. The Secretary shall also seek to consult with the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom for appropriate sections of the report.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

A DEBT TOO FAR?

A CASE STUDY OF THE MONTAGNARDS IN VIETNAM

by
Carlos R. Messer Jr., Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Michael Weaver

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; distribution unlimited.
April 2008

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Contents
Page

DISCLAIMER ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..i

LIST OF

ILLUSTRATIONS……………………………………………………………………………………………………..iii

PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………………………………………iv

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….v

INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………1

WHO ARE THE MONTAGNARDS? …………………………………………………………………………………2

FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA………………………………………………………………………….4

MONTAGNARD SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH……………………………………………………………………6

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM………………………………………………………………………………….9

MONTAGNARD SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. ………………………………………………………………………12

MONTAGNARDS UNDER COMMUNIST RULE……………………………………………………………………14

USING THE DIME …………………………………………………………………………………………………15

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………………………………21

List of Illustrations
Page
Figure 1. PMSI Borders -1946………………………………………………………………………………..8

Preface

The general idea behind this research paper was to highlight an area of the Vietnam War that is often neglected, but has relative significance for future U.S. military involvement abroad. The Montagnard situation in Vietnam is an excellent example of how large, hegemonic states exploit minority indigenous populations for national interests and then withdraw when those interests become unattainable. I chose this issue to not only associate the reader with the Montagnards, but to also serve as reminder that there can be long-term consequences for those allies left behind to fend for themselves.

This is particularly relevant today considering that the United States supports minority indigenous populations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As a reader, you should come away with more questions than answers about long-term obligations of the United States in regard to the Montagnards. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Weaver for his valuable insight on the Vietnam War and his weekly presentations on a wide variety of Vietnam-related issues. Additionally, I would like to recognize Dr. Paul Brezinski for his guidance and assistance with the editing of this paper.

AU/ACSC/17-2567/2003-04

Abstract

This case study of the Montagnard tribes of Vietnam provides a compressed history of the Montagnards from 1857 to present with an emphasis on the French-Indochinese War and then the Vietnam War. Initially, a working knowledge of the Montagnard tribes is required and provided via primarily anthropological sources. This is crucial to highlight the differences between the Montagnards and the mainstream Vietnamese population. With the introduction of missionaries to Indochina, the French influence on the Montagnards became evident. As France tried to re-establish its colonial rule after WWII, the Montagnards supported the French against the Viet Minh. The question is, why did the Montagnards support the French and vice versa?

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and subsequent withdrawal form Vietnam, the
Montagnards turned to the U.S. for support. Once again, why did the Montagnards choose to support the U.S. and what did the U.S. gain by supporting the Montagnards? The final section of the paper discusses the DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, economic) instruments of power and how these can be brought to bear in regard to the current Montagnard situation. The conclusion is intended to ask the reader whether or not the U.S. has any obligation to the Montagnards in lieu of the Vietnam War support or the current Montagnard plight. It is an open-ended question by design, but either answer has its own set consequences.

Introduction

The Vietnam War, as far as U.S. involvement is concerned, is a well documented chapter of American history. There are volumes of literature dedicated to the military’s role in the war, the political failures associated with the war, and the less than ideal outcome of the war. Within this plethora of documentation, a reader will find only a handful of anthropological information concerning Vietnam prior to 1975. It is within these references that the name Montagnard will appear with much frequency.

For the sake of simplicity, the term Montagnard (French for mountaineer) is used as an all-encompassing word to describe various ethnic minorities within the central highland region of Vietnam. These groups include the Bru, Pacoh, Katu, Bahnar, Rhade, Jarai, Cua, Hre, Sedang, Rengao, Halang, Jeh, Monom, Roglai, Stieng, Sre, Chru, Maa, Nop, Mnong, Kayong, Lat, Cil, Hroy, Rai and Koho. The story of the Montagnards is very similar to that of numerous other indigenous populations who were conquered and exploited by one colonial power or another.

However, what is unique about the Montagnards is their relationship with their French colonial masters and their subsequent association with the U.S. These relationships are central to this paper and thus create a question that has yet to be answered. Does the U.S. government have a moral (or any other) obligation to the Montagnards in regards to their current situation in Vietnam? To adequately construct a response, it is important to explain who the Montagnards are and why both the French and U.S. governments supported them.

Additionally, it is equally relevant to understand why the Montagnards themselves supported their French colonial masters and later the U.S. military during their respective occupations of Vietnam. This question of responsibility addresses the obligation of an occupying power that utilizes an indigenous population for its own interests, but is then forced out of the occupied country (or voluntarily withdrawals).

The result is an indigenous minority left to fend for itself against the victor. The focus of this paper is intended to highlight the plight of the Montagnards, but may in fact offer some valuable lessons regarding the use of indigenous populations to further U.S. interest-based involvement in other parts of the world.

Who Are the Montagnards?

Prior to any discussion of the Montagnards and their involvement with the French and U.S. governments, it is crucial that the reader understand exactly who the Montagnards of the
Vietnamese central highlands represent and how they are uniquely different from the ruling majority in Vietnam. Two thousand years ago, the Montagnards settled along the coast and fertile valleys of southeast Indochina.

Over the centuries, other cultures gradually filtered into their homelands. First, the Cham people expanded their kingdom throughout the coastal lowlands and the Mekong Valley. Later, the Chinese ancestors of today’s ethnic Vietnamese migrated south along the coast of the South China Sea. Together, these ambitious and expanding cultures forced the Montagnards deeper and deeper into the highlands. This isolation aided their survival and created a cleavage between the two cultures.

For the Montagnards, man and society are embedded in nature and dependent upon cosmic forces. In the highlanders’ world of forested mountains, sweeping, plateaus, and valleys through which numerous rivers flow, each ethnic group over time worked out its adaptation to nature and shaped its society. This evolutionary process resulted in a unique social structure that was very different from the Vietnamese in the low land areas.

Adaptation to the mountain country created among them physical and spiritual bonds that gave rise to a common culture – a highlander culture.1 Montagnards are different from the Vietnamese in that they speak languages of the Mon Khmer or Malayo-Polynesian linguistic stocks and physically resemble Cambodians, Malays and Indonesians. Although divided into nearly 40 distinct ethnic groups, Montagnard characteristics have historically set them apart from the Cham and Vietnamese.

In a world centered on small communities, kinship was primary and resources were shared by all. The people respected the integrity of their natural surroundings, and each society had leaders who served as stewards in preserving it. Livelihoods were based on agriculture with rice as the staple crop. Villagers farmed slopes and bottomland within the never-ending cycle of rainy seasons followed by dry seasons that were used to cultivate future farm land. The forests supplied game, wild fruits and vegetables, and firewood as well as hardwood, bamboo, and rattan for their houses, artifacts and wood carvings. Although their religious practices varied, all of the highland people tried to keep in harmony with their deities.

This fact, as will be discussed later, began to change with the influx of missionaries into the central highlands. The highlanders expressed themselves through art, architecture, music, and dance. The highlanders remained relatively distant from the Chinese culture that molded the society of the Vietnamese and others. Cham rulers had some relations with some highland leaders and there was some trade with outsiders. The lowlanders, by and large, regarded the mountain country as remote and forbidding, populated by backward tribes.

The Vietnamese remained in their orderly lowland villages surrounded by paddy fields. Most importantly, the lowland Vietnamese were exposed to various cultures through trade and war that shaped their culture both religiously and politically. The influence of both India and China introduced the concepts of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. These religions, in addition to the ever-present naturalist view of life by the lowland Vietnamese created a unique mix of beliefs that differed greatly from the Montagnards.2 Politically, the lowlanders were exposed to various emperors, colonialism, and later communism.

These, too, distanced the traditional Vietnamese from the Montagnards. As the various kingdoms and dynasties among the Cham, Khmer, Lao and Vietnamese rose and fell, the Montagnards remained geographically separated from the traditional Vietnamese lowlander. “All the while in the background, the mountains, their peaks shrouded in fog, the Montagnards carried on with a relative sense of normalcy.”3
French Involvement in Indochina

Having established the distinct differences between the Montagnards and Vietnamese lowlanders, it is equally important to understand exactly why the French colonial machine decided to make inroads into Indochina in the first place. This set of facts will go a long way in explaining the French relationship with not only the Montagnards, but also with the traditional Vietnamese population. In July 1857, Napoleon III decided to invade Vietnam. The decision was based on two distinct factors, but the first was merely an excuse to justify the second.

In 1856 the Chinese executed a French missionary in southeastern China, and in 1857 the
Vietnamese emperor, faced with a domestic crisis, tried to destroy foreign influences in his country by executing the Spanish bishop of Tonkin. Napoleon III, in effect, was given the religious justification to occupy Indochina. Publicly, Napoleon III rushed to the aid of French missionaries being prosecuted by the Annamites.4

In January of 1857, Napoleon III received a letter from abbey Hue, a former missionary to China, concerning the French interests in Indochina. France was already considering intervention in the region to protect the interests of the Catholic Church, but this particular communiqué sparked new interest. The abbey Hue’s letter crafted both political and religious arguments why France should embark upon a campaign into Indochina. Abbey Hue stated, “The Far East will soon be the theater of great events. If the emperor wills, France will be able to play and important and glorious role there.”5

Abbey Hue proceeds to explain how exactly France can accomplish this feat. France had a claim to territory in Indochina based on an old treaty of 1787.6 Hue claimed that circumstances were now favorable because the population of Annam was suffering under the tyranny of the current regime and would welcome the French as liberators. Direct intervention by France, with the full support of the Catholic Church, would save the French missionaries and ensure the ongoing conversion efforts of the people of Indochina. Ultimately, the validity of the treaty of 1787 was challenged by France’s ruling elite and discounted, but Napoleon III, nonetheless, used the guise of protecting French citizens abroad coupled with the support of the Catholic Church to launch what would become a century-long colonization of Vietnam.

Despite the overt reasons presented by Napoleon III as to why it was necessary for France to make an entrance into Vietnam, the underlying decision was purely imperialistic. France was competing against other European powers for economic and military superiority. Quite simply, France wanted to secure more strategic geographic positions to promote their international trade and capitalism France’s interest in Vietnam was economically motivated and the French thought that the Mekong River could possibly be a gateway to the huge Chinese market. Unfortunately, the Mekong turned out not to be a navigable river to China. To generate the necessary profits to run its Indochinese colony, the French introduced a plantation economy to facilitate rubber extraction and various other exports.

The French also introduced consumer goods such as opium, alcohol, and cigarettes to generate revenues to support the running of the colony.7 ultimately, the long-term industrial development of Vietnam centered around three key basic necessities for the development of modern industry – power, raw materials and labor. The coal deposits in the Tonkin region could potentially supply power for years and the water-power resources of the mountainous central highlands were numerous and untapped. There was a large labor supply, but it was mostly unskilled.

This, in turn, meant that some sort of education was necessary to properly train a potential labor force. Education, as will be discussed later in this paper, is one of the key reasons that the French garnered Montagnard support. It is important to note that the Montagnards, unlike the Vietnamese population, were left relatively undisturbed by the French economic expansion.

Many groups exercised a large degree of autonomy and remained free of French control until as late as 1940. Economically speaking, the French envisioned Indochina as the “jewel in the crown” of France in Indochina and rival the British colonies worldwide.8

Montagnard Support for the French

Although the French had established an economic and political foothold in Vietnam, history tells us that the relationship between the French administrators of the colony and the Vietnamese population was very tenuous. In their quest to create a self-sufficient, profit-making Vietnamese colony, the French were very successful at alienating the common people and creating a corrupt caste system that would ultimately ruin the colony.

This hostility towards the French by the Vietnamese is well documented, but why did the Montagnards not subscribe to the anti-French sentiment sweeping Vietnam? More specifically, why did the Montagnards support the French in Vietnam during the French-Indochinese War that began in 1946? The answer to these questions partly lies in the distinct differences between the Montagnards of the central highlands and the Vietnamese majority that were previously discussed. More importantly, Montagnard support for the French stemmed from a belief that the French could provide the one thing that Montagnards most desired: autonomy. Within this idea of self-government and independence, the French also offered education and the potential to build a military force capable of defending the central highlands against numerous domestic enemies. The French, unlike the Vietnamese, had appealed to the Montagnards sense of nationalism and self worth.

Rather than alienate the Montagnards as backwards savages, the French gave them an opportunity to stake a claim in a rapidly changing Vietnamese landscape. The French-Montagnard connection, although very complex, was really quite simple to understand from both a French and Montagnard perspective. From a French point of view, the Montagnards made up a sizable portion of Vietnam’s population that could support French efforts to industrialize many of the most remote sections of Vietnam.

Additionally, in true colonialist fashion, the French could divide and alienate the population of Vietnam under the “divide and conquer” model and thus more easily manage one of its most lucrative colonies. It made perfect sense considering the historical distrust and disdain by the Montagnards towards the Vietnamese and vice versa. Unlike the French, however, the Montagnards had little interest in economics or colonial rule. The Montagnards were nationalists in a sense that they sought recognition of the central highlands as an autonomous region that was self-governed, self-sufficient, and self-defended.

For these reasons, the Montagnards sought to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the French government. Given the fact that the Montagnards were considered second-class citizens by the Vietnamese and had no rights under Vietnamese law, the French provided hope for an independent future. The first item on the Montagnard nationalist agenda was the quest for political autonomy that effectively freed the tribes from outside governmental intervention. More specifically, cooperating with the French offered the Montagnards the promise of educational opportunity and military service which could manifest itself into government representation and ultimately self-rule. The realization of this goal manifested itself beginning in early 1945.

With the defeat of Japanese forces that had occupied Indochina since 1940, the French government sought to reestablish itself as the colonial proctor of Vietnam. The French were not expecting the Viet Minh, who had successfully battled Japanese forces during WWII, to rise up in protest to the resurgence of French colonial rule. Taking advantage of the ill will between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards, the French began recruiting Montagnards for what would become the French-Indochinese War (1945-1954).

This was, in fact, the opportunity that the Montagnard leaders had been seeking. During the war, the French recruited thousands of Montagnards, including teenagers who would form the backbone of the central highland defenses. At its peak, the French officially fielded the Battalion de Tirailleurs Montagnards du Sud-Annam (BTMSA -South-Annam Montagnard Tirailleurs Battalion) and approximately thirteen additional battalions of armed Montagnard militia to fight against the Communist Viet Minh Figure

1. PMSI Border – 1946 forces throughout Vietnam.9 Due to the fierce loyalty of the Montagnards and their commitment to defeating Communism in Vietnam, Admiral Georges d’Argenlieu (French High Commissioner for Indo-China) created an autonomous Montagnard state with the May 27, 1946 signing of the Pays Montagnards Du Sud Indochinois (PMSI) – Country of the Montagnards of South Indochina (Attachment 1).

The ordinance gave the Montagnard people a “statute particular” granting self-governance and the ability to leverage existing military forces for self-defense. The actual territory is outlined in Figure 1. Unfortunately for the Montagnards, this new found independence would be short lived. In 1949, the French created the Associated State of Vietnam under Emperor Bao Dai to foster cooperation with the Vietnamese.

In 1950, the French classified PMSI as a “crown domain” directly under the control of Bao Dai. The Vietnamese king suppressed Montagnard autonomy and instituted land reforms designed to allow Vietnamese citizens to acquire and populate Montagnard land. By 1972 there were nearly 450,000 Vietnamese living in the central highlands, compared with about 30,000 in 1953.10 Montagnard independence officially ended in 1954.

The French forces were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 and were forced to the bargaining table with Ho Chi Minh’s Communists. At the Geneva Convention in July 1954, the French-Indochina War was declared over. The convention was attended by delegates from France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam.

The French did not allow representatives from PMSI to participate in the convention. Subsequently, Vietnam was divided into two separate countries and the French withdrew all forces. Under the new Saigon regime, Montagnard independence was not recognized and the military forces were disbanded. This status would not change until the arrival of U.S. forces in 1961.

U.S. Involvement in Vietnam

In stark contrast to the French intervention in Vietnam, the U.S. involvement had nothing to do with economics and everything to do with the fear, or perceived fear, of Communism. America’s involvement in Vietnam began in 1950, but the origins of the Vietnam War can be traced back to the end of WWII and the French effort to reassert its dominance in Indochina. France had exercised control of the region since the late 19th century and resentment against this rule by the Vietnamese people was widespread.

The Vietnamese nationalist movement emerged because of this colonialism and a desire to be free of any foreign control.11 one of the leaders of the nationalist movement was Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow trained Communist, who founded the Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Minh) during WWII to fight the Japanese. In September 1945 the Viet Minh proclaimed the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), with Ho as its president; and in March 1946 this new government was recognized as a free state within a French union.12 The French government did not support this declaration and by December 1946 the war between the French and the Viet Minh had begun. When the French-Indochina War broke out, the U.S. was faced with a serious dilemma: It had to choose between aiding the French and thereby violating anti-colonial beliefs, or aiding a nationalist movement that just happened to be Communist.

The U.S. “at first tried to remain neutral. It did not help the French or Viet Minh.”13 The U.S. sided with the French only after the Chinese formerly recognized the Viet Minh in 1950. Despite large amounts of U.S. aid, the French position in Vietnam continued to deteriorate. The U.S. administration began to perpetuate the “domino theory” that symbolically placed Vietnam at the head of a row of countries that would potentially fall in succession if Communism prevailed in Vietnam. Thus, in order to block the possibility of Communist expansion, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations supported the French forces in Vietnam. “The justification offered for this policy was not that we wished to strengthen colonialism but rather that a military success by international Communism be avoided.”14 By 1954, U.S. aid to the French was at its peak, but French popular support was at its lowest point.

The key event that ended the war was the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a fortress town in northern Vietnam, where the French army of 20,000 soldiers allowed itself to be trapped by Ho and the Viet Minh forces. In May 1954 a nine power conference met in Geneva to find a peaceful solution to the French-Indochinese conflict. The delegates were from the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Communist China, and the French Indochinese states. The agreement temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel, “pending mutual withdrawal of troops, the transfer of population, and the holding of free elections.

The assumption was that Vietnam would then become united and Communist.”15 France soon withdrew form Vietnam, but that did not leave the South open to the Viet Minh. The U.S. moved into this power vacuum and pledged its support to the Ngo Diem government that had been installed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In turn, Diem pleaded to the U.S. for support in the fight against the Communists.

The U.S. responded to this request because it feared that Southeast Asia might fall to the Communists.16 This sequence of events is the prelude to direct involvement in Vietnam by U.S. personnel. The transition from French occupation to U.S. occupation was complete and the situation for the Montagnards of the Vietnamese central highlands would be directly affected by this change of hegemons.

In 1960, the insurgency in South Vietnam had reached sufficient intensity to alarm the
Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and U.S. leadership. It was apparent then, and evens more so in 1964, that the communist insurgency was gaining momentum in areas that were populated by Montagnards. “There were estimates that over 50% of the rural population of the highlands were Viet Cong (VC) sympathizers.”17 Communist efforts aimed at securing support from the Montagnard minority, which numbered approximately one million, were feared all the more due to the strategic location of the central highland region.

The long-standing animosity and mutual distrust which existed between the Montagnards and the lowland Vietnamese had prevented them from cooperating with one another for the purposes of defense or socio-economic development. Thus, the areas of the central highlands had very little GVN presence. The Viet Cong hoped to step in and fill this vacuum, create operating bases amongst the Montagnards, recruit, and train its insurgents in the isolation and safety of the central highlands. Recognizing the importance of the developing situation in the central highlands, the U.S. government organized the Combined Studies Division (CSD). This pilot program sent a CSD researcher and an Air Force medic to live in the village of Buon Ea Nao for one year.

The result was a negotiated settlement between local village elders and the US military which promised military and socioeconomic assistance in return for support of the GVN. The village elders agreed to support the GVN and deny support to the VC.18 This program would eventually morph into the Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) which encompassed hundreds of self-defended Montagnard villages under the guidance of U.S. Special Forces. This program was also one of the key premises of Montagnard support for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War.

Montagnard Support for the U.S.

As mentioned earlier, the Montagnards sought not only national autonomy but also military autonomy in terms of self-defense forces. The CIDG not only served the interests of the U.S. government militarily, but it also gave the Montagnards a military force that had not been seen since the collaboration with French forces during the Indo-Chinese war years earlier.

By 1963, Montagnard village militia numbered just over 43,000 with 18,000 strike force troops. Many of the irregulars were trained at a Special Forces facility at Hoa Cam, near Da Nang and included some 300 trail watchers, 2,700 mountain scouts and about 5,300 Popular Forces troops.19 As the Montagnard forces expanded, so too did the support from the U.S. government in the form of the Green Berets. Initially, there had been only half of one Green Beret field unit amidst the Montagnard tribes and the other half at the training camp at Hoa Cam.

By the end of 1963, the Green Berets had thirty-six field units, four B detachment command elements, and a C Detachment at Nha Trang for command and service support.20 It was this Green Beret support for the Montagnards that solidified U.S. support throughout the Vietnam War and beyond. Because of the mutual respect between the Montagnard forces and their Green Beret advisors, an intense loyalty developed on both sides. This bond still exists today.

While the Montagnards pledged support to the GVN, the Green Berets pledged to never abandon the Montagnards as the French had done years earlier. “In creating a Montagnard army, American officials tended to give substance to Montagnard autonomy and independence.”21 For the Montagnards, this was the word of the U.S. government and served as a promise for military support until victory was achieved. More importantly, it served as the primary method by which the Montagnards could recruit, train, and equip a military force capable of defending the central highlands from both the VC and possibly the South Vietnamese.

In parallel with the potential build up of forces within the central highlands, Montagnard leaders were also pursuing a nationalist political agenda. Armed with the belief that the French had legally granted them independent status under the 1946 ordinance that established the Pays Montagnards Du Sud Indochinois (PMSI), Montagnard leadership pressed the U.S. representatives in Vietnam to guarantee equal Montagnard representation within the GVN.

The U.S. government pressured the Diem regime for Montagnard representation, but Diem refused. However, in November 1961, Diem was overthrown in a military coup and replaced by General Nguyen Khanh. Khanh quickly appointed Y-Bham Enuol, a Montagnard, as Assistant Province Chief of Daklak Province. This marked the first time that a Montagnard tribesman had held a significant political office. Unfortunately, this political position offered little help to the Montagnard repression and lack of land reform by the Khanh regime.

In a final act of solidarity, Y-Bham Enuol and an underground activist group named the Front Unife De Lutte De La Races Opprimee (FURLO) – United Front for the Libertaion of Oppressed Peoples rose up in protest in the U.S. Special Forces camps in Darlak, Pleiku, and Quan Duc provinces, and carried out coordinated gun battles with GVN troops.22 The rebellion was crushed by the government troops and the incident would bring an end to any future representation of Montagnards in the GVN. CIDG operations continued until January 1971, when U.S. Special Forces turned over all Montagnard camps to the Vietnamese Army Rangers.

23 On January 15, 1973, President Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords on “Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam” were signed on January 27, 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.24 On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese Communist forces stormed the presidential palace in Saigon and achieved final victory. This ended another chapter in Montagnard history, but started the nightmare of survival under Communist rule.

Montagnards under Communist Rule

Because the intent of this paper is to highlight French and U.S. involvement with the Montagnards, the following is only a brief outline of Montagnard life after the Vietnam War. The Montagnard people have endured persecution from the Hanoi regime for over thirty years. Initially, re-education camps in North Vietnam and executions were the norm as the Communists occupied all of Vietnam. This was followed by sweeping land reform that stripped the Montagnards of all ancestral lands and opened the doors for an influx of Vietnamese. “In line with the idea that mountain areas play an important role in national defense, the movement of settlers into sparsely inhabited but strategically sensitive areas is necessary.”25

According to the 2007 CIA Fact Sheet: Vietnam, over 5 million Vietnamese now populate the central highlands. Additionally, Hanoi has long instituted a policy restricting all Montagnard political and Christian religious gatherings.26 A more recent example highlights the ongoing struggle of the Montagnards. In 2001, several thousand Montagnards held a series of peaceful demonstrations in response to the confiscation of their ancestral land and to crackdowns on their freedom to worship.

The Vietnamese government met the demonstrators with force, injuring and arresting hundreds and prompting over a thousand more to flee to Cambodia. Ever since, Vietnam’s Montagnards have been subject to increasing intimidation and violence, a fact that came to international attention during Easter of 2004, when security forces attacked demonstrators killing several–some say hundreds–and wounding many more.27 The combined population of North and South Vietnam was 33 million at the end of the Vietnam War.

There were one million people in the Montagnard tribes. Today, according to a Vietnamese national census, the population has exploded more than 230% to 76 million people. According to these same Vietnamese sources, the Montagnard population remains at 1 million. Western relief workers have a different number. They say the native population is less than 750,000 and still falling. As the Montagnard population dwindles so to does any relief from a sad and violent history.

Using the DIME

The ongoing struggles of the Montagnard people are a major concern for human rights groups around the world, but does the U.S. have a specific debt to pay to this ally from an unpopular war? Is there a moral (or other) obligation to support an indigenous minority population that loyally aided the U.S. in pursuit of national interests abroad? If the answer to this question is yes then how exactly should the U.S. assist the Montagnards in the future? In pursuit of any national objectives, the U.S. should utilize diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to influence other nations.

The diplomacy component involves formal negotiation with other nations to settle differences. It is the job of the professional statesman to pursue this avenue and diplomacy is most successful when supported by the other instruments of power. The information component includes public diplomacy, strategic communication, and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about potential adversaries. The military component encompasses direct military action ranging from peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and nation-building to major combat operations. The use of military power is typically the last resort to conflict resolution.

Finally, the economic component encompasses financial activities that run the gamut from foreign aid programs and market access to imposing trade sanctions. The application of these instruments of power (IOP) can and should directly impact any future relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in regards to the plight of the Montagnards.

Of all the instruments of power, diplomacy is quite possibly the least discussed and most poorly applied instrument with regard to U.S. foreign policy. It is, however, the first step in engaging the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and having any hope of assisting the Montagnards.

After a 20-year hiatus of severed ties, President Clinton announced the formal normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam on July 11, 1995 and the opening of the U.S. embassy in Hanoi.28 Ideally; the U.S. government will leverage this diplomatic angle and apply it directly to the Montagnard situation. First, the U.S. government must openly engage in political exchanges through regular dialogue on human rights and regional security. This dialogue must emphasize equal treatment of the Montagnards and establish cultural zones that allow Montagnards to openly pursue their religion and preserve their unique history.

The current Vietnamese policy of violent crackdown towards Montagnards must be rebuked and highlighted as fruitless. This approach by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) can go a long way in recognizing the Montagnards as a legitimate native society within Vietnam but it serves to soften the bitter relationship between the two peoples within the country. Secondly, the U.S. embassy must recognize the Montagnards as a former ally and seriously consider requests for visas and/or political asylum in the U.S. This action will come to fruition only when the U.S. government passes appropriate legislation.

As of September 2007, H.R. 3096, The Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2007 passed the House of Representatives, was read in the Senate, and was sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Below is specific guidance from H.R. 3096:

Title IV: United States Refugee Policy </b>- (Sec. 401) States that it is U.S. policy to offer refugee resettlement to Vietnam nationals (including members of the Montagnard ethnic minority groups) who are eligible for the Humanitarian Resettlement program, the Orderly Departure program, the Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees program, the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1988, or any other U.S. refugee program, but who were deemed ineligible for reasons of administrative error or certain circumstances beyond their control.29

If passed, this legislation will enable the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vietnam to work directly with the Montagnard people and allow the Montagnards much needed access to the U.S.

Finally, U.S. diplomats in Vietnam should push for the inclusion of Montagnard representation at any bi-lateral talks with the Vietnamese government regarding human rights within that country. This representation will force Vietnamese diplomats to address the issue openly and will open a professional dialogue between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards with the U.S. as a third-party mediator. Until this discussion takes place, the status quo of violent interaction within Vietnam will continue. The use of the diplomatic instrument of power is only the beginning of any U.S. effort to assist the Montagnards and in and of itself is soft power that rarely yields concrete results. Typically, diplomacy works best when used in conjunction with other instruments of power.

Whereas diplomacy offers inroads into negotiations and talks with the Vietnamese government in regards to human rights and the Montagnards, the informational instrument of power has the ability to highlight the plight of the Montagnards on a whole new level. The U.S. government approach to Vietnam in this respect should drastically be increased to include a policy of public diplomacy that emphasizes an American message of freedom and equality.

While diplomacy focuses strictly on relations with foreign governments, public diplomacy focuses on foreign publics through the use of international broadcasting, information programs, exchanges, visitor programs, culture, and various other actions. Arguably, in today’s information-based society, mass communication may be much more effective in the long-term at influencing the politics of other nations.

By highlighting the American ideology of freedom, democracy, and equality, the Vietnamese people will ultimately seek government reform. When this message is accompanied by a policy of treating the Montagnard people with dignity, respect, and justice, it can be one of the most powerful political messages that can be transmitted to the Vietnamese people.

Additionally, a concerted effort to combat Vietnamese propaganda concerning the Montagnards must coincide with any information campaign. Defense against foreign propaganda, deception, and covert political influence operations is typically a much neglected field in the U.S., but many Communist governments like Vietnam actively pursue such options.

The U.S. must actively counteract any propaganda that falsely paints a positive image of Vietnamese-Montagnard relations. Until the DOS makes ardent strides towards an offensive information posture, only the Vietnamese message will persist. Only recently have Montagnard rights been acknowledged by some states and international organizations, most notably the United Nations Organization (UNO).

Despite growing international attention to the plight of the Montagnards, they remain threatened with extinction by political, economic, and cultural forces controlled by the Vietnamese government. Although many non-governmental human rights organizations continually publish reports highlighting the Montagnard situation, these organizations are mostly restricted from direct contact with Montagnards by the Vietnamese government.

The DOS has the access and the media outlets to wage an effective information campaign against Vietnamese propaganda in the area of human rights. Without an aggressive approach to the information instrument of power, the Vietnamese and international public will be vulnerable to Communist attempts to distort accurate perceptions of reality and to influence policy that will ultimately seal the fate of the Montagnard people.

In contrast to all of the other aspects of the DIME model, the use of the military instrument of power in Vietnam will spur a whole host of emotional responses. Any direct use of the military to assist the Montagnards or actually facilitate an armed Montagnard insurgency would never pass U.S. public scrutiny nor is it even militarily possible at this moment in history.

Ironically, it just may be the military instrument of power that gives the U.S. government the most bargaining power when it comes to human rights and the Montagnards. Starting in November 2002, with the port visit of the USS Vandergrift, a US Navy missile frigate, to Ho Chi Minh City, the U.S. began a steady military-military dialogue with Vietnam to discuss regional security.

In June 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam and stated, “In the meetings today [Monday] with the minister of defense, we discussed our mutual desire and their agreement that we should increase the levels of exchanges at all levels of the military, and in various ways, to further strengthen the military-to-military relationship.”30 The U.S. should make great strides in fostering this burgeoning military relationship. The economic impact of such a relationship is obvious and will be discussed in the next section, but the real value of this military-military contact lies in the ability to influence Vietnamese policy through the use of military assistance.

By becoming actively involved in the regional security issues facing Vietnam, the U.S. can potentially create a situation where Vietnam is dependent on U.S. military aid to counter the growing regional influence of China. Vietnam cannot compete with the Chinese militarily, but U.S. military assistance can even the playing field significantly. Additionally, military sales provide valuable intelligence about the capability of the Vietnamese armed forces.

The U.S. can exploit this intelligence through the sale of military goods and the availability of military assistance. If this dependent relationship evolves into full-scale military sales, the U.S. will have the leverage to facilitate policy change within the Vietnamese government and thus address Montagnard human rights issues. As an added side-effect, the increase of military cooperation will further expose Vietnamese military personnel to the American ideology discussed previously.

Any opportunity to educate Vietnamese military leadership under the tutelage of the U.S. military offers long-term benefits. Ultimately, the military instrument of power in Vietnam, as divisive as the subject is, may in fact be the best way to assist the Montagnards.

The final, and most crucial, instrument of power is that of economics. This instrument of power can have an immediate impact if leveraged as a tool to dictate Vietnamese policy towards the Montagnards. U.S. trade with Vietnam has grown steadily since 1992 and should continue to increase. Since 1992, trade with Vietnam has increased by 2000% and includes goods from the following sectors: life science, opto-electronics, information and communications, electronics, manufacturing, advanced materials, aerospace, weapons, and nuclear technology.31 This fact, coupled with the addition of Vietnam to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2007, gives the U.S. its best opportunity to engage Vietnam on human rights issues.

The U.S. can choose a number of methods in which to exercise economic power. First, liberal or restrictive trade policies can open up or deny markets that are critical to Vietnam. Lack of access to U.S. markets can be detrimental for developing industrial countries, and many industries worldwide are dependent on U.S. markets. Next, U.S. decisions concerning financial policy have a profound impact on the entire world. Once tied to the U.S. dollar, Vietnam would be impacted directly by U.S. monetary policy.

Finally, the tightening or loosening of U.S. currency has enormous implications throughout the globe. The U.S. has long used foreign aid to entice nations into taking actions favorable to U.S. interests. By the same token, the U.S. can apply economic sanctions against countries that choose to act in “unfriendly” ways. Combined, all of these methods offer the U.S. the opportunity to influence Vietnam in a manner that is not only favorable economically but one that adequately insures that the human rights violations inflicted upon the Montagnards come to a complete stop.

The bottom line when using the economic instrument of power is subtlety. As trade and foreign aid continue to increase between the U.S. and Vietnam, economic pressure needs to keep pace. As the dollar amounts rise, so should the demands on the Vietnamese government to soften the harsh stance on Montagnard civil liberties. If /when Vietnam reaches “favored nation” status economically, then the U.S. will possess the means by which to dictate Vietnamese policy. At this point, the Montagnards should expect meaningful changes to the status quo. It was through military power that the U.S. used the Montagnards, but it is through economic power that the Montagnards can use the U.S. to attain human rights in Vietnam.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the intent of this historical analysis of the Montagnards is to provide insight into the possible outcomes of utilizing an indigenous minority population to further the interests of a large hegemonic power. The situation, as described, is not unique to the Montagnards nor is it something unfamiliar to either the French or the U.S. governments. The French have experienced similar situations in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean while the U.S. dealt with indigenous populations in Afghanistan and Iraq to name a few.

In all of these cases the end result was the same; the occupying power exploited the minority population to further its political interests and then withdrew for a variety of reasons. These minorities, without continued aid, were forced to succumb to the victor and thus be subjected to retaliation for supporting a foreign occupier. This fact should serve as a lesson for future operations by large, hegemonic powers who intend to occupy countries without the support of that country’s [majority] population.

The question of long-term obligation is rarely asked due to the fact that no country goes into a conflict with the intention of not achieving its objectives. However, based on the facts in this paper and the historical track record of both France and the U.S. during occupation operations, perhaps some consideration should be given to the unplanned end state of withdrawal short of victory and how this affects those allies left behind.

In the case of the Montagnards, it can be argued that the French colonial machine did intend to assist the Montagnards in attaining some level of autonomy, but it was always contingent upon a continued French presence in Indochina. However, the French did not include the Montagnards during the Geneva Convention of 1954 and thus reneged on any promises that were made.

The U.S., too, promised the Montagnards equal representation in the South Vietnamese governmental process, but these promises eroded as the U.S. situation in Vietnam degraded. Any hope of political autonomy evaporated as the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam. Subsequently, the answer to the question of obligation by both the French and U.S. governments in 1954 and 1973 respectively was answered. At that particular time, neither government felt obligated to the Montagnards.

Is this dilemma any different by today’s standards? As far as the U.S. is concerned, does the government have any obligation to the Montagnards in lieu of the situation over the past 30 plus years? If the answer to the question is yes, then the U.S. should take greater strides to remedy the situation in Vietnam. By utilizing the DIME, the U.S. can actively engage Vietnam in a variety of ways designed to ultimately affect Vietnamese policy toward the Montagnards. By leveraging U.S. hard and soft power in Vietnam, the U.S. can force the Vietnamese government to take positive steps towards human rights and simultaneously fulfill a past promise to the Montagnards.

Additionally, governmental strategists should seriously consider the long-term effects of utilizing a minority indigenous population to further national interests in any future conflicts abroad. Current military operations worldwide could potentially leave other indigenous minority populations to the same fate as the Montagnards. The cultural consequences to these populations can be severe and irreversible. If the answer to the question of U.S. obligation is no, then the status quo can continue with little regard for the outcome.

The U.S. can pursue its interests abroad with a clear conscience and the knowledge that obligation stops when the U.S. military withdraws. However, the reputation of the U.S. and the ability to project power worldwide could be in jeopardy and it should come as no surprise if the same indigenous populations that once supported the U.S. decide to extract some semblance of revenge. Either way, it is a question worth answering.

Appendix A

ORDINANCES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

FEDERAL ORDINANCE OF 27 MAY 1946 CREATING A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSARIAT FOR THE MONTAGNARD POPULATIONS OF SOUTH INDOCHINA.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF FRANCE FOR INDOCHINA,
Chancellor of the Order of Liberation,
Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor,

Pursuant to the decree of August 17, 1945, creating the office of the High Commissioner of France for Indochina and defining the powers thereof;
Pursuant to the decree of August 17, 1945, on the nomination of the High Commissioner of France for Indochina;
Pursuant to the decree of October 20, 1911, defining the powers of the Governor-General of Indochina;
Pursuant to the Federal ordinance of November 1, 1945, determining the provisional conditions for the exercise of legislative and regulatory power in the Indochinese Federation.
The Council of the Federal Government being in agreement,

O R D E R S:

Article 1. The provinces of Darlac, Haut-Donnai, Lang-Bian, Pleiku and Kontum form a special
administrative division which will bear the title “Commissariat of the Federal Government for
the Montagnard Populations of South Indochina”, and cease to be under the jurisdiction of the
Commissariat of the Republic for South Annam.

Article 2. Nevertheless, and on a provisional basis, due to the necessity for liaison between the
civil and military commands, the provinces of Haut-Donnai and Lang-Bian will continue to be
the responsibility of the Commissariat of the Republic for South Annam until such date as is
determined by a decree of the High Commissioner.

Article 3. The Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Montagnard Populations of
South Indochina is directly dependent of the High Commissioner of France for Indochina and is
appointed by him. His powers are, within the scope of the provinces specified in Article 1,
identical to those of Commissioners of the Republic in their respective jurisdictions.

Article 4. The seat of the Commissariat of the Federal Government for the Montagnard
Populations of South Indochina is established at Banmêthuôt.

Article 5. This ordinance shall be published in the official Journal of the Indochinese Federation.

Done at Saigon, on May 27, 1946.
Signed: G. d’ARGENLIEU

WE, HIS MAJESTY BAO-DAI
CHIEF OF STATE
Pursuant to Decree No. 1 of July 1, 1949 establishing the organization and functioning of the
public institutions;
Pursuant to Decree No. 2 of July 1, 1949 organizing the statute of the public administrations;
Pursuant to Decree No. 6 of April 15, 1950 the attachment to our person the provinces and
territories inhabited by the non-Vietnamese populations traditionally dependent upon the Crown;
Pursuant to Decree No. 33/QT of April 15, 1950 regarding personnel serving in the provinces
and territories directly attached to our person;
Pursuant to Decree No. 3/QT/TD of July 25, 1950 creating a special administrative division
name Delegation of His Majesty for the Royal Domains P. M. S. “the Montagnard country of the
South”.
Pursuant to the agreements of March 8, 1949 and in conformity with the rights of man as
defined in the charter of the United Nations;
Pursuant to the oaths of allegiance sworn to our person on May 31, 1946 in Banmêthuôt by the
representatives of the populations of the Montagnard country of the South;
Pursuant to the wishes expressed by the representatives of the Montagnard populations on May
26, 1950 in Kontum, on June 5, 1950 in Pleiku, on June 10, 1950 in Darlac, on June 26, 1950 in
Haut-Donnai:

O R D E R:
Article 1: The non-Vietnamese populations living on the territories called “Montagnard country of the South” (P.M.S.) receive, by this present ordinance, a special statute to be destined to guarantee at the same time the eminent rights of Vietnam and the free evolution of these populations in the respect of their traditions and of their customs. This statute is defined by the following arrangements:

Article 2: The territories of the P.M.S. the Montagnard country of the South, which have always
been dependent traditionally on the Crown of Annam, are and will remain attached directly to
our person.

Article 3: The political, administrative and judicial evolution of the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South” will be conducted in such a manner as to lead, as far as possible, towards a
greater participation by the Montagnards in the management of the affairs of the Montagnard Country of the South “P.M.S.”.

Article 4: The natural chiefs, hereditary or selected by the native populations — councilor of district, of province, representatives of the various assemblies and customary tribunals, chiefs of sectors; of canton, of townships — are retained with their titles and prerogatives as well as in the exercise of their powers.

Article 5: An economic council composed of the most qualified representatives of the agricultural, industrial and commercial interests of the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the
South” will be instituted to provide its opinions regarding matters of concern to those interests.

Article 6: The administration of justice will continue to be assured, in matters of litigation where only Montagnards are involved, by the existing customary tribunals or those to be created.
These tribunals will continue to apply the customs particular to each ethnic group concerned.

Besides, an adaptation of the Vietnamese legislation, of the French legislation and of particular customs will be sought in view of their application in litigations where Montagnards are involved, either with Vietnamese or with Frenchmen, or with other nationals of the French Union or with foreigners. For this purpose, there will be created a Mixed Study commission charged with:
1/ – establishing a judicial organization project for the High Plateaux;
2/ – pursuing the definition and codification of customs, taking into account their-evolution, jurisprudence, and the necessities of the present.

This Commission may have recourse to the experts and must be within six months of delay to submit the results of their works to our scrutiny. A judicial ordinance will thereafter be promulgated which will determine competent jurisdictions and the legislation applicable in those cases foreseen in the second paragraph of this present article. Until such time as this ordinance is promulgated, the status quo, in these matters, will be maintained.

Article 7: The rights acquired by the natives over landed property are guaranteed them in entirety. In order that these rights to be respected, sales, rentals, acquisitions and in general all acts involving land rights will receive the approval of the administrative authority, after notification to the native leaders and all consultations in conformity with tradition.

Article 8: In order to improve the physical and intellectual conditions of the populations of the
P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South”, medical aid and education will be the objects of development plans as extensive as financial possibilities permit. The medical assistance plan will be established in harmony with that which the world health organization could have foreseen for the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South”. The teaching of dialects will be maintained to the full measure to which it is deemed necessary, and will continue to constitute the basis of primary education for the natives. The teaching of the Vietnamese language and of the French language will be conducted according to the conditions ‘specified under the regulations particular to the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South” concerning the transfer of responsibilities in the matter of education. The training of native cadres, especially for military, administrative, medical and scholastic needs, will be the object of a special effort.

Article 9: Obligatory military duties will not be any heavier for the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South” than they are for other parts of the State of Vietnam. Save for those cases foreseen in existing conventions, the Montagnards will not be called upon to serve in military units stationed outside the P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the south”, and will be assigned with priority to the defense of their own territory.

Article 10: The Director of the Cabinet of His Majesty and the Delegate of His Majesty for the
P.M.S. “the Montagnard country of the South” are charged with the execution of this ordinance, each according to that which concerns him.

DALAT, May 21, 1951
Bao Dai

Bibliography
Anderson, Vivienne, and Laura Shufelt. Your America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1964.

Brands, H.W. The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War. Oxford University Press US,
1993.

Church, Peter. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.

Condominas, G. Nous avons mangeÌ la foreÌ‚t de la pierre-geÌnie GoÌ‚o. We Have Eaten the
Forest: The Story of a Montagnard Village in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.
Translated from the French by Adrienne Foulke; photos, maps, and diagrs. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1977.

CIA Fact Sheet: Vietnam. www.cia.gov/publications.

Current, Richard C., Alexander D’Conde, and Harris L. Dante. United States History: Search for
Freedom. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1977.

Department of the Army CMH Publication 90-23. US Army Special Forces 1961-1971.
Washington, 1989.

Ennis, Thomas. French Policy and Developments in Indochina. University of Chicago Press,
1936.

Foreign Trade Statistics. ATP Data-Imports and Exports. www.census.gov/foreign-trade.

Graff, Henry F. The Free and the Brave. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977.

Hickey, Gerald C. Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 19541976. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Hickey, Gerald C. Shattered World: Adaption and Survival among Vietnam’s Highland Peoples
during the Vietnam War. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.

Hickey, Gerald C. Sons of the Mountain Gods: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central
Highlands to 1954. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.

Hickey, G. C. Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock, Texas:
Tech University Press, 2002.

Hofstadter, Richard, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron. The United States: The History of a
Republic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Hue, the Abbey. Memoir of the Abbey Huc addressed to the emperor. Ministere des Affaires
Estrangres, Memoires et documents, Asie, France, 1857.

Lippe, Paul. The World in Our Day. New York: Oxford book Company, 1972.

McCuen, LTC John J., The Art of Revolutionary War. Stockpile Books, 1966.

Mole, R. L. The Montagnards of Vietnam: A Study of Nine Tribes. Rutlan, VT: C.E. Tuttle Co.,
1970.

NAVPERS 15991. The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact. Washington, 1968.

Prados, John. The Hidden Story of the Vietnam War. Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1995.

RAC T-477. Outline History of the 5th SF Group: Participation in the CIDG Program 19611970.
U.S. Army Military Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 28.

Robequain, Charles. The Economic Development of French Indochina. Translated by Isabel A.
Ward. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

“Rumsfeld Moves to Expand U.S. Military Relations with Vietnam, Indonesia.” VOA News, 5
June 2006, www.allbusiness.com/government3698997-1.html.

Septans, Albert. Les commencements de l’Indo-Chine francais. Paris, 1887.

Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam
1965-1973. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.

Sumner, Ian, Francois Vauvillier, and Mike Chappel. Osprey Men at Arms n. 315: The French
Army 1939-1945. London: Osprey, 1998.

The Vietnam Center and Archive. Texas Tech University. Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02 -
Military Operations.

The Vietnam Center and Archive. Texas Tech University. Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 -
Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support.

The Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2007. HR3096, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007.

“Vietnam: Montagnards Beaten, Killed during Easter Week Protests.” Human Rights Watch
Press, 14 April 2004.

Xunhasaba. Editorial. Vietnam Courier. 1 March 1977, 12.

End Notes
1 Gerald C. Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954-1976. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1982.
2 NAVPERS 15991, The Religions of South Vietnam in Faith and Fact, 25 Oct 1968, 1.
3 Gerald C. Hickey, Sons of the Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1982, 291 and 321.
4 Annam (Vietnamese: An Nam) was a French colony in what is now central Vietnam.
5 Memoir of the abbey Huc addressed to the emperor, January, 1857, France, Ministere des Affaires Estrangeres,
Memoires et documents, Asie, XXVII, 288.
6 By the second article of the treaty France promised to send the fugitive king of Annam, Nguyen-Anh, four frigates,
infantry, and artillery to aid him in regaining his throne; and Ngyuyen-Anh promised to cede to Franc the port of
Tourane (Da Nang) as payment (Albert Septans, Les commencements de l’Indo-Chine francais [Paris, 1887], pp. 7983).
7 Charles Robequain. The Economic Development of French Indochina. Translated by Isabel A. Ward. London:
Oxford University Press, 1944, 100-141.
8 Thomas E. Ennis, French Policy and Developments in Indochina, University of Chicago Press, 1936, 113-114.
9 Ian Sumner, Francois Vauvillier, and Mike Chappel, Osprey Men at Arms n. 315 : The French Army 1939-1945,
London: Osprey, 1998, 9.
10 Hickey, Free in the Forest, 253.
11 Paul Lippe, The World in Our Day, New York: Oxford Book Company, 1972, 98.
12 Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, The United States: The History of a Republic, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967, 835.
13 Richard N. Current, Alexander D’Conde, and Harris L. Dante, United States History: Search for Freedom,
Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1977, 592.
14 Lippe, World in Our Day, 154-155.
15 Vivienne Anderson, and Laura Shufelt, Your America, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964, 964.
16 Henry F. Graff, The Free and the Brave, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977, 757.
17 RAC T-477, Outline History of the 5th SF Group: Participation in the CIDG Program 1961-1970. U.S. Army
Military Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 28.
18 LTC John J. McCuen, The Art of Revolutionary War, Stockpile Books, 1966.
19 John Prados, The Hidden Story of the Vietnam War, Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1995, 75.
20 Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973, Novato,
CA: Presidio, 1995, 157-185.
21 H.W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War, Oxford University Press US, 1993, 81.
22 CMH Publication 90-23, US Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1989,
63-64.
23 Ibid., 154.
24 Peter Church, A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore. John Wiley & Sons, 2006, 193–194.
25 Xunhasaba, Editorial, Vietnam Courier, March 1977: 12.
26 CIA Fact Sheet: Vietnam, www.cia.gov/publications.
27 Human Rights Watch Press, “Vietnam: Montagnards Beaten, Killed during Easter Week Protests,” April 14,
2004.
28 CIA Fact Sheet: Vietnam, www.cia.gov/publications.
29 The Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2007, HR 3096, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007,
http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/110_HR_3096.html
30 VOA News, ”Rumsfeld Moves to Expand U.S. Military Relations with Vietnam, Indonesia,” 5 June 2006,
http://www.allbusiness.com/government3698997-1.html.
31 Foreign Trade Statistics, ATP Data-Imports and Exports, www.census.gov/foreign-trade.